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Investors’ reaction to stock recommendations is often incomplete so that there is a predictable 
post-recommendation drift. I investigate investor inattention as a plausible explanation for this 
drift by using prior turnover as a proxy for attention. I find that low attention stocks react less to 
stock recommendations than high attention stocks around the three-day event window. 
Subsequently, the recommendation drift of firms with low attention is more than double in 
magnitude when compared to firms with high attention. Similar conclusions are reached with 
alternative proxies for attention. The evidence supports investor inattention as a source of the 
stock recommendation drift. 
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I. Introduction 
Existing literature finds that while security analysts’ stock recommendations lead to an 
immediate price reaction, a drift continues in the subsequent months (Womack, 1996; Barber, 
Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman, 2001; Boni and Womack, 2006). Although it is possible that 
analysts possess some superior ability to predict future stock price movements, there should be 
no price drift if the market recognizes that analysts possess such ability.1
Presumably, a recommendation has an immediate impact on the stock price because it 
reveals information about the firm.2 A predictable drift afterward begs the question as to why 
this information did not get fully incorporated in the stock price when the recommendation was 
released. One could potentially appeal to short sale constraints (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 
2002; Nagel, 2005) as an explanation as to why a negative drift follows downgrades. However, it 
is not as obvious why there is an underreaction to upgrades. Barber et al. (2001) suggest that 
markets are semi-strong inefficient so that stock returns are predictable based on public 
information such as stock recommendations. This paper posits investor inattention as a possible 
avenue of this inefficiency. If investors temporarily neglect the information contained in stock 
recommendations, a predictable drift follows when investors gradually incorporate this 
information. 
Theoretical models predict that investor inattention may cause underreaction to public 
information. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2005) present a model where a subset of investors neglect 
information regarding the firm’s future profitability contained in an earnings surprise. 
                                                 
1 There is some evidence that analysts herd (Welch, 2000; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2009), although there is also some 
indication that they anti-herd (Bernhardt, Campello, and Kutsoati, 2006). Analysts’ recommendations could also be 
affected by conflicts of interests (see the survey by Mehran and Stulz, 2007). Even if analyst recommendations 
contain some bias, this does not explain why investors systematically fail to account for such biases so that the 
market typically underreacts to stock recommendations. 
2 Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) demonstrate that analysts sometimes produce their own interpretation of already 
public news about the firm. However, an interpretation of already public news may also constitute material 
information about the firm. 
1 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089773
Consequently, the firm’s stock price underreacts to announcements of earnings surprises. Peng 
and Xiong (2006) indicate that investor attention constraints lead to “category learning” so that 
investors focus on market-wide and industry-wide information rather than on firm-specific 
information. This implies that investors may underreact to firm-specific information such as 
analysts’ stock recommendations. Peng (2005) also reports that investor attention could vary 
across firms. For example, they may allocate more attention to large firms since these firms 
contribute greater fundamental uncertainty to their portfolios. It is important to note that, in 
general, an inattention-based explanation requires some limits to arbitrage. Otherwise, it would 
suffice to have one single attentive agent with no capital constraints to drive the stock price to 
fundamental value instantly.3
Empirical studies examining the impact of investor inattention on asset prices can be 
classified into two types. The first group of studies uncovers the predictability of returns in 
certain settings and posits investor inattention as an explanation. For instance, Hong, Torous, and 
Valkanov (2007) find that a number of industry returns can forecast the market’s return by up to 
two months and contend that investors are inattentive to the predictive information contained in 
industry returns. Similarly, Cohen and Frazzini (2008) report abnormal profits while using a 
strategy of buying (selling) firms whose customers experience positive (negative) news and 
argue that investors are inattentive to customer linkages between firms. The second group in the 
literature defines an attention proxy and then investigates the implications of inattention on asset 
prices. For instance, Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2006), using share turnover as a proxy for investor 
attention, demonstrate that an earnings momentum strategy is more profitable when investors are 
                                                 
3 Another argument is that attention constrained investors could specialize in a few stocks so that they are fully 
attentive to those stocks. However, if investors are risk averse and time and attention are costly, highly attentive 
investors are limited in the extent that they are willing to bear risk in order to exploit mispricing (Hirshleifer and 
Teoh, 2003). 
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inattentive. They argue that underreaction driven anomalies should be more profitable when 
investors are inattentive. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) find that the market’s reaction to earnings 
announcements is more complete during regular weekdays than on Fridays. They attribute this 
reaction to investors being distracted by the approaching weekend. Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
(2009) use high news days (days with numerous earnings announcements) as a proxy for investor 
inattention and find that reactions to earnings announcements are weaker on such days. My study 
fits into this second group. I define a proxy for attention and test whether the recommendation 
drift is more pronounced when investors are inattentive. To my knowledge, there are no studies 
that address whether inattention contributes to the recommendation drift. An empirical advantage 
of the setting of recommendations is that there are clearly defined categories of favorableness. 
Further, unlike seasonal earnings announcements, stock recommendations occur throughout the 
year. 
This study also addresses the question as to whether some recommendations result in 
higher abnormal returns than other recommendations. Kecskes, Michaely, and Womack (2009) 
indicate that recommendations with concurrent same direction earnings forecast revisions are 
more profitable. Loh and Mian (2006) report that analysts who possess more accurate earnings 
forecasts at the time of the recommendation issue more profitable recommendations. Sorescu and 
Subrahmanyam (2006) find that low strength recommendation changes by analysts from 
reputable brokerages are associated with more return persistence. However, none of these studies 
explicitly examine whether the level of investor attention surrounding a firm contributes to the 
profitability of stock recommendations. My findings suggest that inattention is a potential 
explanation for the stock recommendation drift. 
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I proxy for investor attention using the prior turnover in the firm’s stock following Hou et 
al. (2006). I argue that prior trading activity directly proxies for the amount of active attention 
investors pay to the firm. Each day, I sort firms with recommendation changes into two groups: 
high prior turnover and low prior turnover. I then compare the response of investors to rating 
changes issued for these two groups. I posit that recommendation changes on low turnover firms 
will have weaker reactions, but stronger drifts. The evidence strongly supports this hypothesis. 
Strikingly, the drift following recommendation changes for low turnover firms is more than 
double that of high prior turnover firms. 
Trading activity around and after the recommendation event reveals patterns consistent 
with the inattention hypothesis. I demonstrate that the stock’s average daily turnover is higher in 
the three-day event window when compared to the stock’s average turnover in the prior three 
months. However, this increase in turnover is much lower in magnitude for low prior turnover 
stocks, consistent with investors failing to pay enough attention to the recommendations on these 
stocks. In the next three months, the pattern reverses. Turnover increases more for low turnover 
stocks consistent with inattentive investors reacting with a delay to recommendations. 
Trading volume can also be associated with other firm characteristics, such as liquidity 
and uncertainty (Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam, 2007). To purge uncertainty and illiquidity 
from turnover, I sort stocks on their residuals from a cross-sectional regression involving the 
universe of stocks with turnover against the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and analyst 
forecast dispersion. With this cleaner measure of attention, I continue to find that low attention 
stocks have larger stock recommendation drifts. I also use institutional ownership, analyst 
coverage, the number of earnings announcements, and a free float-adjusted prior turnover 
measure as alternative dimensions to define investor attention and find corroborating results. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II lays out the hypotheses and the 
proxies for investor attention. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the main results 
while Section V reports additional tests. Section VI presents my conclusions. 
II. Hypotheses and Proxies 
Investor attention can be identified based on multiple dimensions, but I focus on the 
attention surrounding a firm. Alternatively, one could look at the analyst dimension (do investors 
pay more attention to an analyst from a reputable broker?) or at the market level (does the market 
pay less attention on high news days?). A firm-level perspective allows for more powerful tests 
that exploit the cross-sectional variation in attention across firms. More importantly, this suits the 
express objective of stock recommendations; that is, to guide investors in stock selection.4
If investors are inattentive to stock recommendations on some firms, they may not react 
as strongly to these recommendations. As such, the corresponding drift in prices would be more 
pronounced. My measure of the level of attention investors are paying to a firm uses the prior 
amount of trading in the firm’s stock. I specifically target the average daily turnover of the stock 
over the three months prior to the recommendation. Trading volume has been used as a proxy for 
attention in various other papers. Hou et al. (2006) use the prior turnover of a firm’s stock as a 
proxy for investor attention regarding a firm and examine its implications for price and earnings 
momentum. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that positive momentum stocks with low prior 
turnover (which they suggest is a measure of neglect) earn much higher returns over a longer 
period than positive momentum stocks with high turnover.5 Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) 
                                                 
4 Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006) also adopt a firm-level perspective to investigate whether some analysts are 
more informative based on the covered firm’s characteristics such as size, analyst coverage, institutional ownership, 
etc. However, they look at earnings forecasts and not stock recommendations. Further, they focus on the absolute 
value of the reaction, while my focus is on both the magnitude and direction of the reaction. Most importantly, they 
consider only the event reaction while I consider both the event reaction and the subsequent drift. 
5 Empirically, the literature has examined the magnitude of price and earnings momentum conditional upon turnover 
(Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Hou et al., 2006). My approach is similar except that it examines the stock 
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observe that the returns of high turnover stocks lead the returns of low turnover stocks. They 
report that turnover disentangles the effect of firm size from trading volume since turnover has a 
low correlation with firm size. Studies that also use the volume of a stock as measures of 
visibility are Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgri (2001) and Barber and Odean (2008). 
For my purpose, a firm whose shares are actively traded is likely to have vigilant 
investors who are attentive to news events like analyst recommendation changes. Any 
underreaction following recommendation changes would be less severe with a large pool of 
attentive investors. Alternatively, a firm whose shares have low turnover is likely to have a 
smaller proportion of vigilant investors resulting in a delayed response.6
In robustness tests, I examine measures of attention that control for other variables that 
are also associated with turnover, but not directly related to investor attention. Trading volume 
could proxy for differences of opinion among investors (Diether et al., 2002) or the liquidity of a 
firm’s stock (Amihud, 2002). For instance, low trading volume can also be associated with 
illiquidity. As a result, prices could take longer to adjust due to illiquidity and not because of 
inattention. Therefore, it is important to disentangle these effects to obtain a sharper measure for 
attention. Separating turnover into its various components is also similar to the approach in 
Chordia et al. (2007) who decompose turnover into components related to visibility, uncertainty, 
and liquidity. To compute residual turnover that is orthogonal to illiquidity and uncertainty, I sort 
firms on the residual turnover from a cross-sectional regression of the universe of stocks’ prior 
                                                                                                                                                             
recommendation drift conditional on prior turnover. Another distinguishing feature is that my study is based on an 
event. Therefore, it can jointly examine the reaction and drift of the event. This allows for richer tests on 
underreaction. 
6 I check the impact of adjusting the prior turnover proxy by the stock’s free float. I use data on director and officer 
ownership from Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009). To the extent that insiders own their shares passively, a turnover 
measure based on free float would be a better measure of attention. However, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) report 
that for a typical firm, the insider ownership fraction fluctuates significantly over time, especially in response to past 
stock returns. It is not clear, therefore, whether free float-adjusted turnover is superior to raw turnover as a proxy for 
active attention. Nevertheless, I repeat the portfolio tests with a measure of free float-adjusted turnover and find 
support for my conclusions. I thank Rudi Fahlenbrach for providing their data.  
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turnover against the prior Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and the most recent analyst forecast 
dispersion. In additional tests, I use analyst coverage, institutional ownership, and the number of 
earnings announcements in a day as other proxies for attention. The following three related 
hypotheses summarize the implications of investor inattention on stock recommendations. 
Hypothesis 1a: The magnitude of stock recommendation reaction for firms with 
low prior turnover is smaller than that for firms with high prior turnover. 
Hypothesis 1b: The magnitude of stock recommendation drift for firms with low 
prior turnover is larger than that for firms with high prior turnover. 
Hypothesis 1c: The proportion of return on the recommendation date as a 
percentage of the total recommendation return is smaller for low prior turnover firms. 
III. Data and Sample Statistics 
A. Stock Recommendation Data 
The sample of individual analyst recommendations is from Thomson Financial’s I/B/E/S 
U.S. Detail File from 1993-2006. Due to limited coverage in 1993, I focus on rating changes 
where the current rating is issued from 1994 forward. I/B/E/S reports ratings ranging from one 
(strong buy) to five (sell). I reverse the ratings (five for strong buy and one for sell, etc.) so that 
higher ratings correspond to more favorable recommendations. I focus on rating changes and not 
levels since prior research confirms that changes are more informative than levels (Boni and 
Womack, 2006; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2009; Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman, 2009). The 
recommendation change, RECCHG, is computed as the current rating minus the prior rating by 
the same analyst. Anonymous analysts are removed as we cannot track their revisions. By 
construction, . When an analyst initiates a recommendation, I compute 
RECCHG as the new rating minus a hold rating of three. I also screen out stale ratings by 
]4,4[−∈RECCHG
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removing recommendation changes where the prior rating is more than one year old (stale 
definition follows Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman, 2007). 
In an important paper, Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) examine seven 
downloads of I/B/E/S recommendations data from 2000-2007 and find inconsistencies in 
matched observations across downloads. In response to their paper, they report that Thomson 
Financial restored such alterations to the recommendation history file as of February 12, 2007. 
My paper uses the corrected March 15, 2007 snapshot.7
The chosen sample undergoes further screens. Since my objective is to investigate the 
recommendation drift and not the earnings announcement drift, I remove stock recommendations 
that are issued in the three-day window centered on the I/B/E/S quarterly earnings announcement 
date. Thirteen percent of all eligible recommendation changes are removed. This fraction is 
similar to that reported in Womack (1996) and Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007). A portion 
of the sample period is affected by Rule 2711 of the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD). Part of the rule required a broker to report the distribution of stock ratings across its 
coverage universe. Many brokers reissued recommendations so that their recommendation 
distributions looked less optimistic. This rule was approved on May 8, 2002 with an 
implementation period ending September 9, 2002. As a result, 2002 contains the most number of 
recommendations in I/B/E/S (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman, 2006). Hence, I remove 
rating changes where the current rating is issued between May 8, 2002 and September 9, 2002 
                                                 
7 To test the sensitivity of my results to potential residual I/B/E/S problems, I also use alternative methodology and 
recommendation datasets and arrive at the same conclusions. First, I redefine recommendation changes using the 
broker code instead of the analyst code. Using the broker code deals incorrectly with analyst job changes, but it 
allows me to restore anonymized analysts into the recommendation dataset as I/B/E/S does not anonymize the 
broker code. Second, I report results from 1994-2000 using an I/B/E/S snapshot on January 19, 2001. Using this 
early snapshot intentionally avoids the time period when the I/B/E/S alterations were found to have taken place. To 
the extent that these alterations are a result of analysts or brokers trying to touch up their pre-regulation stock 
picking histories during the period of heightened regulatory scrutiny on analysts, the early snapshot should be closer 
to an “as was” tape. Finally, I switch from I/B/E/S to First Call recommendations and repeat the main tests. All these 
additional tests provide support that the paper’s findings are insensitive to the choice of recommendation database. 
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(inclusive) and where the prior rating was issued prior to May 8, 2002. Such rating changes are 
not likely to be motivated by stock selection. 
B. Stock Return Data 
The daily returns of U.S. firms are from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). I only include stocks classified as ordinary shares (Share Codes 10 or 11). Delisting 
returns are added from the CRSP delisting file. In cases where the delisting return is missing, I 
follow Shumway (1997) by inserting a delisting return of -30% if the corresponding delisting 
code indicates a performance-related delisting. Firms in the sample must also have available and 
non-negative book-to-market (B/M) information from the CRSP-Compustat Merged File. The 
B/M ratio is computed as in Fama and French (2006). As benchmarks for some tests, I compute 
the returns of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (DGTW) characteristic portfolios 
from this universe of CRSP stocks.8
C. Construction of Attention Proxies and Control Variables 
For each trading day in the sample, firms with recommendation changes are sorted into 
two groups of high turnover and low turnover stocks based on the average prior daily turnover 
over [-63, -2]. Daily turnover is the CRSP-reported number of shares traded divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding. Following LaPlante and Muscarella (1997), I divide the volume of 
NASDAQ firms by two to account for the double counting of inter-dealer trades. For 
recommendations on non-trading days, Day 0 is the first trading day after the recommendation 
date. A three-month horizon is more suited in my setting as I want to capture the most recent 
                                                 
8 Every July, firms are first sorted into quintiles based on their market cap on June 30 of each year using breakpoints 
determined from NYSE stocks. Second, firms are then sorted within each size quintile into quintiles based on their 
B/M ratios. Third, firms within each size-B/M group are sorted into momentum quintiles every month based on the 
buy-and-hold return over the prior 12 months skipping the most recent month. Therefore, the size and B/M rankings 
are updated every 12 months while the momentum rankings are updated monthly. Finally, the stocks within each 
characteristic portfolio are equally weighted at the beginning of each month and the buy-and-hold average daily 
returns are computed. 
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attention surrounding the stock immediately prior to the recommendation event. Because periods 
of one week or one month may be too noisy to compute a reliable measure of attention, studies 
such as Gervais at al. (2001) and Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008) rely on roughly three months 
of turnover when defining visibility. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Hou et al. (2006) use up 
to 12 months to compute prior turnover. While using a 12-month horizon produces similar 
results, I stick to a three-month horizon for the baseline tests since longer horizons underweight 
the most recent attention accorded to the stock. 
For some tests, I require additional measures of illiquidity, analyst forecast dispersion, 
and analyst coverage. A stock’s liquidity is measured using the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure, which is the average daily absolute return divided by the daily dollar trading volume (in 
millions) over the same horizon that prior turnover is measured. The two analyst variables are 
from the I/B/E/S Summary Unadjusted U.S. File. Analyst coverage is the most recent number of 
analysts contributing to the monthly consensus FY1 earnings forecasts. Forecast dispersion is the 
most recent standard deviation of estimates divided by the absolute value of the mean estimate. 
D. Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
Figure I presents the distribution of the 218,537 recommendation changes in my sample. 
There are nine categories of rating changes from -4 to +4, but I note that extreme rating changes 
occur less frequently. To ensure that there are sufficient recommendations in the extreme rating 
change categories, I classify ratings changes into five groups. Rating changes in [-4, -2] are 
classified as the most downgraded stocks and those in [+2, +4] are the most upgraded stocks. 
Rating changes of -1, 0, and +1 make up the middle three groups. 
Insert Figure I about here. 
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Table I, Panel A reports annual descriptive statistics of the 1994-2006 sample. Overall, 
the assembled sample contains stock recommendations issued by 8,751 analysts from 569 
brokers for 8,154 firms over a 13-year sample period. The average recommendation change 
across all observations is 0.275 (an upgrade). The analyst level statistics in Panel A are computed 
first by averaging repeated analyst-year observations and then taking the cross-sectional average 
across all analysts in that year. Firm-level averages follow a similar procedure. The average 
number of firms covered by an analyst is 4.78 and the average number of recommendations 
issued by an analyst in one year is 6.53. I note that the number of analysts issuing 
recommendations for a firm in a typical year is 3.92 and the average market cap is slightly over 
$3 billion. On average, about 64 firms are recommended in a typical day in the sample. As such, 
there would be a sufficient number of firms each day to allow them to be sorted into high and 
low attention groups. The average daily turnover (in the three months prior to the 
recommendation) for a typical recommended firm is 0.4852%. 
Insert Table I about here. 
Panel B of Table I presents statistics by turnover groups. Here, the averages are computed 
for firm-level statistics by averaging repeated firm years within each turnover group, and then 
taking the average across all firm year averages within each turnover group. The average prior 
turnover is 0.8110% for a typical high turnover firm and 0.2600% for a low turnover firm, 
evidence that I have economically meaningful differences in turnover. I note that the average 
market cap of low turnover firms is $3.647b, slightly larger than that of high turnover firms 
($3.199b). Thus, there is no evidence that high turnover firms are larger firms. Low turnover 
firms have 2.74 analysts issuing recommendations in a typical firm year compared to 4.08 
analysts for high turnover firms, suggestive of greater visibility for high turnover firms. 
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IV. Results 
A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
Figure II plots the average CAR (in percent) of the extreme rating changes up to three 
months. The daily abnormal return (AR) is the raw CRSP return less the return on a matched 
DGTW portfolio. Using the market return as a benchmark does not affect any of the conclusions. 
The CAR is simply the cumulative sum of the ARs. To prevent the results from being biased by 
low priced stocks, the CAR excludes observations where the lagged stock price is less than one 
dollar. 
Insert Figure II about here. 
One can see that recommendation changes indeed convey steep event reactions. More 
importantly, I note interesting differences between high and low turnover stocks. According to 
Hypothesis 1a, the event day reaction to rating changes will be lower for low turnover stocks. 
Correspondingly, Hypothesis 1b predicts that the drift after the event date would be more 
pronounced for low turnover stocks as investors slowly incorporate the information contained in 
these recommendations. Figure II demonstrates that for low turnover stocks (dotted lines), rating 
changes tend to have a smaller reaction around the event date. The trend of smaller reaction and 
larger drift for low turnover stocks is visually evident. 
Next, Table II tests whether the average recommendation change CARs are meaningfully 
different between low and high turnover stocks. Note that the standard errors in this analysis are 
clustered by calendar day to account for cross-correlation between firms. I first focus on the 
event date [-1, 1] reaction to recommendation changes. Panel A tests Hypothesis 1a to determine 
whether the rating change event reaction magnitudes are smaller for low turnover stocks. This is 
indeed the case. For the most downgraded group, high turnover stocks see an average [-1, 1] 
 12
CAR of -4.137% while low turnover stocks experience an average CAR of -2.801% (a difference 
of 1.335% that has a t-statistic of 6.10). For the most upgraded stocks, the difference between the 
CAR of low and high turnover stocks is -0.130% (t=1.63). Although the support for Hypothesis 
1a for upgrades is weak in this univariate setting, later multiple regression estimations will 
provider stronger support.9 Next, looking at Group 5-1 (most upgraded minus most 
downgraded), the low turnover stocks produce event reaction CARs that are 1.465% (t=-6.29) 
less than the CARs of the high turnover stocks. 
Insert Table II about here. 
Next, I test Hypothesis 1b, to ascertain whether recommendations issued for low turnover 
stocks are associated with larger drifts. The evidence in Panels B-D of Table II indicates that 
recommendation changes associated with low turnover stocks experience larger drifts. Consider 
the two-month horizon. The average [2, 42] CAR of the most upgraded minus the most 
downgraded stocks is 1.259% for high turnover stocks, but 2.767% (more than double) for low 
turnover stocks. Overall, Table II provides support for the hypotheses. That low turnover stocks 
produce less reaction and larger drifts in response to analysts’ stock recommendation changes is 
consistent with an inattention explanation for the stock recommendation drift. 
B. Underreaction Coefficients 
Next, I consider the ratio of the event date reaction to the total return implication of the 
recommendation. This is the underreaction coefficient in Cohen and Frazzini (2008). To 
illustrate, suppose a recommendation produced a CAR of 5% for the period [-1, 42] and the 
                                                 
9 When another measure of attention is used (residual turnover that controls for illiquidity and dispersion), the 
difference becomes statistically significant at t=2.45. The results from the multiple regression in Table VI also 
provide support for Hypothesis 1a for upgrades. The reader may also be concerned that upgrades for low attention 
stocks appear to convey more total return over the entire -1 to +63 horizon than upgrades for high attention stocks. 
However, unreported tests determine that this difference disappears economically and statistically once I control for 
other firm variables used in Table VI. 
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event reaction over [-1, 1] is 3%. The underreaction coefficient is 6.053 =÷ , meaning that 60% 
of the recommendation’s two-month return occurred on the event date. An underreaction 
coefficient, , represents underreaction and any other positive number represents 
overreaction.
)1,0[∈
10 Among cases of underreaction, a lower number represents greater underreaction. 
Figure III reports the underreaction coefficients. Shaded bars in Figure III denote the high 
turnover group and striped bars denote the low turnover group. For example, the chart for the 
one-month CAR demonstrates that the underreaction coefficient for the 5-1 recommendation 
group is 82.9% for the high turnover group. This percentage is derived by taking 
6.037/(6.037+1.246), where the high turnover 5-1 group’s event reaction of 6.037% is from 
Table II, Panel A, and 1.246% is from the corresponding cell in Panel B for the drift of the high 
turnover group. The underreaction coefficient for the low turnover 5-1 group can also be 
computed similarly and it is 70.0%. This indicates that for the high turnover group where 
investors are presumably paying attention, 82.9% of a rating’s one-month return occurs during 
the three-day event window while only 70.0% of a rating’s one-month return occurs on the event 
window for low turnover stocks. 
Insert Figure III about here. 
At the two-month horizon, the difference in underreaction is even starker. The proportion 
of the two-month most upgraded return that on the event date is 82.7% for high turnover stocks 
is only 62.3% for low turnover stocks. In sum, Figure III provides support for Hypothesis 1c. A 
larger fraction of the return associated with rating changes occurs on the event date for high 
turnover stocks as compared to the fraction for low turnover stocks. 
                                                 
10 There could also be negative numbers for this ratio (e.g., when the event day reaction is -2% and the two-month 
return is 10%). One could think of such cases as neither underreaction nor overreaction, but some kind of “wrong” 
reaction. 
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C. Calendar-Time Portfolios 
To determine whether the differences in CAR hold in portfolio strategies, I form daily 
calendar-time portfolios. For each turnover group, five daily rebalanced portfolios buy and hold 
stocks for two months with rating changes matching the five rating change groups. I focus on the 
two-month holding period for the portfolio tests as I earlier determined that the average stock 
recommendation drift trails off in the third month.11 Following Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and 
Trueman (2006) and Fang and Yasuda (2007), the return for a portfolio containing rating change 











ττττ .  (1) 
The weight  is the cumulative value of one dollar invested in the recommendation from the 
day the recommendation enters the portfolio to the close of trading on day 
τix
1−τ . This buy-and-
hold approach avoids the upward bias in equal weighting as describe in Canina, Michaely, 
Thaler, and Womack (1998). Note that if a stock is recommended multiple times, each rating is 
treated as a separate observation. Return days where the lagged price is less than one dollar are 
excluded from the portfolio. Additionally, in cases when there are no ratings in day τ  for the 
portfolio, I assume an investment in the market portfolio. The daily time-series of portfolio 
returns from Equation (1) are cumulated to monthly returns and the risk-free rate is subtracted. 
The monthly portfolio excess returns are regressed on the Fama and French (1993) three factors 
plus momentum (factors from Kenneth French’s website).  
                                                 
11 I also verify in unreported results that the unconditional stock recommendation drift is about 2% the first month, a 
statistically significant 0.5% the second month, and almost zero in the third month. Thus, it seems reasonable to 
exclude the third month from our baseline portfolio strategies (although the results also hold for a one- or three-
month holding period). 
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The time-series average of the DGTW characteristics-adjusted returns are also reported in 

















ττττ   (2) 
This is the same as the previous equation except that all terms refer to the return of 
recommendation i’s benchmark portfolio. The daily time-series of  are then cumulated to 
monthly returns , and the time-series average of  is reported in the tables. The 
characteristics-adjusted returns have the advantage of not assuming that the factor exposures are 
constant over the entire sample period. Finally, I compute industry-adjusted returns where the 







We can see in Table III that for high prior turnover stocks (Panel A), the abnormal return 
of the hedge portfolio (5-1) measured by the four-factor model is 0.802% per month (t=3.94). 
For the low prior turnover group, the abnormal return is about double in magnitude at 1.633% 
(consistent with earlier results in Table II). The difference between the low and high turnover 
groups is 0.831% (t=3.42). Similar results are obtained when looking at excess returns, DGTW-
adjusted returns, or industry-adjusted returns. 
Insert Table III about here. 
D. Calendar-Time Results with Residual Turnover 
 Sorting stocks on prior turnover could capture variables other than attention as turnover is 
constructed from volume which could also proxy for illiquidity or the differences of opinion 
among investors. To address these concerns, I sort stocks based on their residual turnover. For 
the universe of stocks, I estimate a cross-sectional regression of average prior turnover against 
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. The 
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regression residual is used to sort firms with recommendation changes into high and low 
attention firms. By construction, this residual is an attention measure orthogonal to illiquidity 
and dispersion. Table IV reports the results of portfolio strategies that are closely similar to those 
in Table III except that residual turnover is used. The results in Table IV are consistent with 
earlier results and support the attention hypothesis. 
Insert Table IV about here. 
V. Additional Tests 
A. Change in Turnover Around Recommendation Change Event 
To determine if the conclusions on the inattention hypothesis are robust, Table V reports 
the increase in turnover, defined as average turnover in [-1, 1] minus average turnover in [-63, -
2] to see if investors are indeed slower to trade on recommendations on low attention stocks. 
Note in Panel A that the change in average daily turnover is much lower in magnitude for low 
prior turnover stocks. For the most downgraded group, a recommendation on a high prior 
turnover (high attention) firm leads to the average percentage daily turnover increasing by 
1.107%. A similar rating on a low prior turnover firm results in only an increase of 0.472% (the 
difference of 0.635% is significant). This trend occurs throughout all five rating change groups 
providing evidence that investors fail to respond sufficiently to recommendations issued on low 
attention stocks. Panels B and C scale the change in turnover by firm variables. This could be 
important if the amount of trading required to impound a recommendation’s information into 
prices is different across different stocks. I consider analyst coverage and institutional ownership 
as scaling variables. I also find that turnover increases more for high attention than low attention 
stocks per unit of analyst coverage or per unit fraction of institutional ownership.12
                                                 
12 The caveat for this particular result is that a smaller trading reaction for low attention stocks is not present if one 
uses prior turnover as the scaling variable. However, since the stocks are sorted by prior turnover, it is not surprising 
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Insert Table V about here. 
This table also reports the change in turnover for the drift horizon. This is simply the 
average daily turnover in the drift window minus the before-event turnover. If investors are 
inattentive to recommendations issued on low turnover stocks, this change will be larger for low 
turnover stocks. I determine that this is indeed the case and that investors react (trade) slowly to 
recommendations on low attention stocks. 
B. Controlling for Post-Earnings Announcement Drift and Other Factors 
In this section, I estimate a regression of recommendation change CAR against a low 
prior turnover dummy and various control variables. This allows me to control for multiple 
potential factors that may be related to recommendation reaction and drift. To control for past 
earnings surprise, I include the most recent quarterly earnings surprise in the CAR regressions. 
Earnings surprise is defined as the most recent I/B/E/S reported actual Q1 earnings minus the 
final monthly consensus analysts’ earnings forecast, scaled by price. I also include a Forecast 
Revision variable. Kecskes et al. (2009) find that rating changes accompanied by earnings 
forecast revisions are more profitable. Forecast Revision is the most recent monthly revision in 
the consensus FY1 earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S, scaled by price. Next, I include a dummy 
variable, Small Broker, which is equal to one if the rating is not issued from a top quintile broker 
based on the number of recommendations issued last year. This controls for the reputation of the 
analyst to the extent that a reputable broker is more likely to house a star analyst. Other usual 
control variables such as dispersion, illiquidity, and analyst coverage are also included. 
Table VI reports coefficients estimates. Since CARs are already characteristics-adjusted 
on size, B/M, and momentum, there is no need for such factor controls in the regression. Panel A 
                                                                                                                                                             
that the change in turnover as a percentage of already low prior turnover is large. Hence, the event reaction result 
here is supportive of the inattention hypothesis to the extent that analyst coverage or institutional ownership are 
better proxies than prior turnover for how much trading is needed for information to be impounded into prices. 
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presents the event date CAR. Low Turnover indicates that the firm is in the lower half of firms 
sorted on their prior three-month average daily turnover. For the most downgraded stocks, a low 
prior turnover results in a significantly less negative reaction. This is consistent with investors 
reacting less to negative ratings in low prior turnover stocks. For the most upgraded stocks, 
investors react significantly less positively when stocks have low prior turnover. Turning to 
Panel B, the finding that low prior turnover results in a stronger recommendation drift remains 
intact even after adding all the control variables. Both the most downgraded stocks and the most 
upgraded stocks have larger drifts when prior turnover is low. 
Insert Table VI about here. 
C. Alternative Measures of Attention 
I also use other proxies for attention. The first measure is related to residual turnover in 
Table IV that controls for illiquidity and dispersion except that multiple proxies are used for both 
illiquidity and dispersion. Using multiple proxies reduces the number of firms with available 
data, but provides a test for the robustness of the result to multiple proxies. To compute this 
measure of residual turnover, I estimate a cross-sectional regression involving the universe of 
stocks with prior turnover against 15 control variables. All the control variables are measured in 
the [-63, -2] horizon and are as follows: 1) Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, 2) average trading 
volume, 3) average dollar trading volume, 4) reciprocal of the average closing price, 5) fraction 
of zero volume days, 6) coefficient of variation (CV) of the Amihud (2002) measure (using CV 
measures of illiquidity suggested by Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman, 2001), 7) CV of 
volume, 8) CV of dollar volume, 9) CV of turnover, 10) holding period return, 11) idiosyncratic 
volatility with respect to the market portfolio, 12) total volatility, 13) analyst forecast dispersion, 
15) most recent earnings surprise (SUE) as in Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), and 15) standard 
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deviation of past eight SUEs. The first ten variables relate to illiquidity while the rest of the 
variables relate to the level of uncertainty surrounding the stock. Sorting stocks on residual 
turnover then provides a measure of turnover that is unrelated to multiple proxies for illiquidity 
and uncertainty. Therefore, one could say the residual proxies for attention (visibility). Abnormal 
returns from a calendar-time hedged portfolio of most upgraded minus most downgraded stocks 
are reported in Panel A of Table VII. Note that the low residual turnover stocks, as a whole, 
experience larger recommendation drifts than the high residual turnover stocks. 
Insert Table VII about here. 
The second and third additional proxies for attention are institutional ownership and 
analyst coverage. The proportion of shares owned by institutions (from Thomson 13f) can proxy 
for the level of sophisticated investor scrutiny, and, as such, the overall level of attention on the 
firm. Analyst coverage is also usually related to a firm’s visibility (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; 
Kecskés and Womack, 2007). Using these two measures of attention produces similar evidence 
that low attention stocks are associated with much larger stock recommendation drifts. 
The fourth proxy is a time-series measure of attention employed in Hirshleifer et al. 
(2009); that is, the number of earnings announcements in a day. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) argue 
that investors may not react fully to information when there are many competing news events. I 
define high news day as days where there are more than 100 Compustat reported quarterly 
earnings announcements. Choosing a numerical cutoff instead of sorting all sample trading days 
on the number of earnings announcements avoids a look-ahead bias. Roughly half (specifically 
58.9%) of trading days have more than 100 earnings announcement events. These are defined as 
low attention days. In Panel D of Table VII, I demonstrate that the stock recommendation drift is 
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more pronounced on low attention days, providing additional support for the inattention 
hypothesis. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of investor inattention on the market’s response to stock 
recommendations. If the market reacts efficiently to the information in recommendations, there 
should not be any predictable drift in stock prices. Extant literature, however, documents a strong 
drift. Barber et al. (2001) argue that this evidence is consistent with semi-strong inefficient 
markets where public information can predict future stock returns. Using a stock’s prior turnover 
as the main measure of investor attention, I test whether investor inattention contributes to a 
larger stock recommendation drift. This would be in line with inattentive investors not reacting 
sufficiently to stock recommendations and a subsequent predictable drift accompanies their 
gradual realization of the true stock price implication of the recommendation. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, I determine that the reaction to recommendation changes 
is much smaller for low prior turnover stocks than it is for high prior turnover stocks. 
Consequently, the recommendation drift is more pronounced for low turnover firms. This result 
is robust to controlling for other variables that could be associated with trading volume such as 
illiquidity and uncertainty. The results also hold for alternative proxies for attention. The 
implication of my evidence is that investor inattention is a plausible explanation for the stock 
recommendation drift. Also, investors would be better off mimicking the stock recommendations 
of firms to which the market is inattentive, so that they can profit from the drift in stock price 
when the market eventually corrects such underreaction. 
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Table I. Sample of Stock Recommendation Changes 
Stock recommendations are from the I/B/E/S Detail Recommendations File from 1994-2006 with anonymous analysts and recommendations made in the three-day window around 
earnings announcements excluded. Firms must be matched to the CRSP universe of ordinary shares. The five-point recommendation scale ranges from one (sell) to five (strong 
buy). A rating change is the current rating minus the prior rating for the same analyst with anonymous analysts and recommendations made in the three-day window around 
earnings announcements excluded. Rating changes based on stale prior ratings (more than one year old) are excluded and the rating change for an initiation is computed as the 
initiation rating minus three (a hold). The average prior daily turnover is measured over [-63, -2] days from the recommendation. Market cap is averaged over [-63,-2] days. For the 
year 2002, rating changes motivated by NASD 2711 are excluded. For annual firm-level statistics in Panel A, repeated firm years are averaged before the cross-sectional average 
across all firms is computed. For analyst-level statistics, repeated analyst year observations are averaged before the cross-sectional average across all analysts is computed. In Panel 
B, the procedure is the same except that the repeated firm and analyst year observations are first averaged within each turnover group. 
 
Analyst-Level Variables   Firm-Level Variables 
Group # of Recs. 
Avg. 
Rec. 




Avg. # of 
Firms 
Covered 




















Panel A: By Years 
1994 19167 0.295 1794 143 7.36 10.68  3039 4.35 1350 0.3184 73.0 
1995 16757 0.250 1895 146 5.88 8.84  3122 3.57 1509 0.3559 64.8 
1996 15439 0.332 2134 174 5.21 7.23  3375 3.29 1791 0.3890 59.0 
1997 15415 0.387 2446 206 4.75 6.30  3660 3.17 2146 0.4114 59.4 
1998 18050 0.356 2793 230 4.77 6.46  3758 3.54 2644 0.4061 68.7 
1999 16741 0.431 2910 222 4.36 5.75  3309 3.83 3594 0.4810 62.7 
2000 14810 0.347 2852 212 3.92 5.19  3110 3.59 4617 0.5498 55.2 
2001 15636 0.282 2779 185 4.17 5.63  2855 4.06 4344 0.5396 59.1 
2002 20057 0.075 2910 194 5.00 6.89  2916 4.99 3609 0.5169 73.6 
2003 19779 0.152 2705 230 5.26 7.31  2872 4.95 3538 0.5452 73.0 
2004 16827 0.217 2738 262 4.65 6.15  2921 4.36 4212 0.5851 63.6 
2005 14702 0.302 2776 269 4.06 5.30  2925 3.85 4537 0.6042 56.0 
2006 15157 0.229 2726 250 4.18 5.56  2965 3.85 4837 0.6730 58.1 
Overall  218537 0.275 8751 569 4.78 6.53   8154 3.92 3231 0.4852 63.6 
Panel B: By Turnover Groups 
High 112276 0.255 7652 519 5.33 7.37   5404 4.08 3199 0.8110 N/A 
Low 106261 0.297 7645 528 5.44 7.50   7318 2.74 3647 0.2600 N/A 
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Table II. Average CAR of Stock Recommendations Changes for Turnover Groups 
 
The average percentage CAR of stock recommendation changes are reported according to turnover groups. For each day, firms 
with rating changes are classified into high turnover and low turnover groups according to the average daily percentage of shares 
traded from [-63, -2] days of the recommendation. NASDAQ firms’ CRSP volumes are divided by two to account for inter-dealer 
double counting. The five-point rating scale ranges from one (sell) to five (strong buy). A rating change is the current rating 
minus the prior rating for the same analyst with anonymous analysts and recommendations made in the three-day window around 
earnings announcements excluded. Rating changes based on stale prior ratings (more than one year old) are excluded and the 
rating change for an initiation is computed as the initiation rating minus three (a hold). Firms are then placed in five rating change 
groups: [-4, -2] (most downgraded), -1, 0, +1, and [+2, +4] (most upgraded). The abnormal return each day is the raw CRSP 
return less the return on a matched size-B/M-momentum characteristic portfolio. Days where the lagged stock price is less than 
one dollar are excluded. Recommendations are from I/B/E/S from 1994-2006. Statistical significance is based on standard errors 
clustered by calendar day with the associated t-statistics in parentheses below the estimates. 
 
Group  High Turnover 
Low 





  Panel A: Event reaction CAR [-1,1]   Panel B: Drift CAR [2,21] 
1 (Most Downgraded) -4.137*** -2.801*** 1.335***   -0.509*** -0.760*** -0.250 
  (-25.69) (-18.87) (6.10)   (-3.41) (-5.95) (-1.27) 
2 -3.859*** -2.419*** 1.440***   -0.400*** -0.487*** -0.087 
  (-28.51) (-25.70) (8.73)   (-3.03) (-5.25) (-0.54) 
3 -0.692*** -0.319*** 0.373***   0.033 0.173** 0.139 
  (-11.77) (-8.59) (5.37)   (0.28) (2.51) (1.01) 
4 1.541*** 1.325*** -0.217***   0.665*** 0.878*** 0.213* 
  (27.77) (30.50) (-3.07)   (7.60) (12.92) (1.92) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 1.901*** 1.771*** -0.130   0.737*** 1.203*** 0.466*** 
  (31.80) (33.42) (-1.63)   (6.98) (14.21) (3.45) 
5-1 6.037*** 4.572*** -1.465***   1.246*** 1.962*** 0.716*** 
  (35.15) (29.00) (-6.29)   (6.81) (12.81) (3.00) 
  Panel C: Drift CAR [2,42]   Panel D: Drift CAR [2,63] 
1 (Most Downgraded) -0.472** -1.083*** -0.611**   -0.175 -0.970*** -0.795** 
  (-2.28) (-6.24) (-2.26)   (-0.70) (-4.65) (-2.44) 
2 0.010 -0.594*** -0.604***   0.128 -0.604*** -0.733*** 
  (0.06) (-4.57) (-2.81)   (0.62) (-4.02) (-2.85) 
3 0.274** 0.334*** 0.060   0.231 0.521*** 0.291 
  (1.99) (3.32) (0.35)   (1.38) (4.21) (1.39) 
4 0.812*** 1.383*** 0.571***   0.969*** 1.683*** 0.714*** 
  (6.32) (14.59) (3.57)   (5.97) (14.71) (3.59) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 0.787*** 1.684*** 0.897***   0.919*** 1.996*** 1.077*** 
  (5.24) (13.99) (4.66)   (4.97) (13.45) (4.54) 
5-1 1.259*** 2.767*** 1.508***   1.095*** 2.966*** 1.872*** 
  (4.92) (13.10) (4.55)   (3.52) (11.59) (4.65) 
***Significant at the 0.01 level 
**Significant at the 0.05 level 




 Table III. Calendar-Time Portfolios of Recommendation Changes Sorted by Turnover 
 
Each day, firms that experience recommendation changes are sorted into two groups based on their average daily turnover [-63, -2] days from the recommendation date. NASDAQ 
firms’ CRSP volume are divided by two to account for inter-dealer double counting. The five-point rating scale ranges from one (sell) to five (strong buy). A rating change is the 
current rating minus the prior rating for the same analyst with anonymous analysts and recommendations made in the three-day window around earnings announcements excluded. 
Rating changes based on stale prior ratings (more than one year old) are excluded and the rating change for an initiation is computed as the initiation rating minus three (a hold). 
Firms are then placed into five portfolios that contain rating changes in [-4, -2] (most downgraded), -1, 0, +1, and [+2, +4] (most upgraded). Firm days where the lagged price is 
less than one dollar are excluded. The daily buy-and-hold weighted average returns (see Equation 1) of each portfolio are computed and then cumulated to monthly portfolio 
returns. The portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate is then regressed against the monthly four factors and the coefficients reported. Also reported is the average DGTW-
adjusted return, which is the portfolio return less the return on a matched size-B/M-momentum characteristic portfolio, and the Fama-French (1997) 49-industry adjusted return. 


















Panel A. High Prior Turnover 
1 (Most Downgraded) 0.084 -0.542** 1.379*** 0.652*** -0.138 -0.413*** 0.8633 111.6 -0.596*** -0.896*** 
 (0.13) (-2.07) (5.33) (8.94) (-1.50) (-8.16)   (-2.98) (-3.06) 
2 0.359 -0.274 1.392*** 0.640*** -0.116 -0.424*** 0.9110 206.0 -0.324** -0.643** 
 (0.56) (-1.33) (7.02) (11.16) (-1.59) (-10.65)   (-2.03) (-2.40) 
3 0.595 -0.078 1.367*** 0.617*** -0.195*** -0.297*** 0.9361 270.1 -0.134 -0.549** 
 (0.96) (-0.46) (8.04) (13.19) (-3.28) (-9.13)   (-0.95) (-2.15) 
4 1.001* 0.197 1.357*** 0.590*** -0.195*** -0.102*** 0.9269 303.5 0.234 -0.148 
 (1.68) (1.14) (7.61) (12.26) (-3.20) (-3.06)   (1.59) (-0.58) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 1.008 0.261* 1.308*** 0.704*** -0.267*** -0.125*** 0.9436 214.1 0.230 -0.082 
 (1.65) (1.68) (7.29) (16.24) (-4.85) (-4.14)   (1.50) (-0.33) 
5-1 0.924*** 0.802*** -0.071 0.052 -0.128* 0.289*** 0.3206 325.7 0.825*** 0.814*** 
  (4.00) (3.94) (-1.28) (0.92) (-1.78) (7.32)     (4.57) (3.79) 
30 
Table III. Calendar-Time Portfolios of Recommendation Changes Sorted by Turnover (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Low Prior Turnover 
1 (Most Downgraded) -0.175 -0.706*** 0.893*** 0.436*** 0.347*** -0.356*** 0.8774 101.4 -0.971*** -1.042*** 
 (-0.46) (-4.97) (-2.77) (11.01) (6.90) (-12.95)   (-7.09) (-6.07) 
2 0.275 -0.386*** 0.964 0.339*** 0.401*** -0.248*** 0.9080 202.7 -0.582*** -0.773*** 
 (0.77) (-3.34) (-1.16) (10.51) (9.79) (-11.07)   (-5.90) (-4.26) 
3 0.816** 0.180 0.938* 0.307*** 0.449*** -0.280*** 0.8944 306.5 -0.081 -0.277 
 (2.32) (1.48) (-1.87) (9.02) (10.40) (-11.87)   (-0.77) (-1.58) 
4 1.437*** 0.650*** 1.018 0.400*** 0.489*** -0.191*** 0.9069 324.7 0.504*** 0.370** 
 (3.96) (5.49) (0.57) (12.13) (11.68) (-8.34)   (5.80) (2.07) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 1.699*** 0.927*** 1.050 0.366*** 0.380*** -0.165*** 0.8881 215.1 0.717*** 0.628*** 
 (4.47) (6.82) (1.34) (9.67) (7.89) (-6.27)   (7.23) (3.21) 
5-1 1.875*** 1.633*** 0.157*** -0.070 0.033 0.191*** 0.1879 316.6 1.688*** 1.670*** 
  (10.76) (9.73) (3.43) (-1.49) (0.55) (5.89)     (10.83) (10.18) 
Panel C. Low-High Prior Turnover 
1 (Most Downgraded) -0.259 -0.164 -0.486*** -0.216*** 0.485*** 0.057 0.5663 213.0 -0.375 -0.146 
 (-0.65) (-0.59) (-6.41) (-2.77) (4.91) (1.06)   (-1.46) (-0.52) 
2 -0.085 -0.112 -0.429*** -0.301*** 0.517*** 0.176*** 0.7249 408.7 -0.258 -0.131 
 (-0.23) (-0.54) (-7.59) (-5.20) (7.03) (4.38)   (-1.20) (-0.53) 
3 0.221 0.258 -0.429*** -0.310*** 0.644*** 0.016 0.7747 576.6 0.053 0.272 
 (0.57) (1.31) (-8.03) (-5.66) (9.25) (0.43)   (0.25) (1.18) 
4 0.435 0.453** -0.338*** -0.190*** 0.684*** -0.089** 0.7656 628.2 0.270 0.518** 
 (1.24) (2.50) (-6.87) (-3.75) (10.67) (-2.53)   (1.41) (2.40) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 0.691** 0.666*** -0.258*** -0.338*** 0.646*** -0.040 0.7703 429.2 0.487** 0.710*** 
 (1.98) (3.72) (-5.32) (-6.77) (10.21) (-1.16)   (2.47) (3.36) 
5-1 0.950*** 0.831*** 0.227*** -0.122* 0.161* -0.097** 0.1430 642.2 0.862*** 0.856*** 
  (3.87) (3.42) (3.45) (-1.80) (1.87) (-2.07)     (3.87) (3.64) 
***Significant at the 0.01 level 
**Significant at the 0.05 level 
*Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Table IV. Calendar-Time Portfolios of Recommendation Changes Sorted by Residual Turnover Controlling for Illiquidity and Analyst 
Forecast Dispersion 
 
Each day, firms that experience recommendation changes are sorted into two groups based on their average residual daily turnover [-63, -2] days from the recommendation date. 
NASDAQ firms’ CRSP volume are divided by two to account for inter-dealer double counting. Residual turnover is the residual from a cross-sectional regression of all firms in the 
CRSP ordinary share universe on the day of the recommendation. The average daily turnover from [-63, -2] is regressed against the average illiquidity from [-63, -2] and the most 
recent I/B/E/S Summary File reported monthly dispersion of analysts’ FY1 earnings forecasts. Within each residual turnover group, firms are then placed into five portfolios 
containing rating changes in [-4, -2] (most downgraded), -1, 0, +1, and [+2, +4] (most upgraded), respectively. A rating change is the current rating minus the prior rating for the 
same analyst with anonymous analysts and recommendations made in the three-day window around earnings announcements excluded. Rating changes based on stale prior ratings 
(more than one year old) are excluded and the rating change for an initiation is computed as the initiation rating minus three (a hold). Firm days where the lagged price is less than 
one dollar are excluded. The daily buy-and-hold-weighted average returns of each portfolio are then compounded to monthly returns, subtracting the risk-free rate then regressed 
on the monthly four factors and the coefficients reported. Also reported is the average DGTW-adjusted return, which is the portfolio return less the return on a matched size-B/M-
momentum characteristic portfolio, and the industry-adjusted Fama-French (1997) 49 industries return. Sample data are from I/B/E/S and CRSP from 1994-2006. *, **, and ***, 
















Panel A. High Prior Residual Turnover (Controls for illiquidity and analyst forecast dispersion) 
1 (Most Downgraded) 0.204 -0.433 1.418*** 0.672*** -0.142 -0.433*** 0.8600 102.6 -0.470** -0.779** 
 (0.30) (-1.58) (5.62) (8.82) (-1.47) (-8.19)   (-2.21) (-2.53) 
2 0.396 -0.258 1.427*** 0.622*** -0.110 -0.425*** 0.9048 192.4 -0.291* -0.605** 
 (0.60) (-1.19) (7.27) (10.34) (-1.43) (-10.17)   (-1.71) (-2.17) 
3 0.597 -0.071 1.377*** 0.599*** -0.190*** -0.310*** 0.9304 252.2 -0.118 -0.546** 
 (0.96) (-0.40) (7.88) (12.20) (-3.05) (-9.10)   (-0.80) (-2.08) 
4 0.979 0.179 1.358*** 0.579*** -0.186*** -0.112*** 0.9214 280.6 0.202 -0.170 
 (1.64) (1.00) (7.37) (11.62) (-2.94) (-3.23)   (1.37) (-0.65) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 0.980 0.239 1.332*** 0.662*** -0.242*** -0.158*** 0.9362 194.6 0.215 -0.102 
 (1.60) (1.44) (7.38) (14.36) (-4.14) (-4.94)   (1.35) (-0.40) 
5-1 0.775*** 0.672*** -0.086 -0.010 -0.101 0.275*** 0.2595 297.2 0.685*** 0.677*** 
  (3.33) (3.14) (-1.48) (-0.17) (-1.33) (6.64)     (3.70) (3.05) 
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Table IV. Calendar-Time Portfolios of Recommendation Changes Sorted by Residual Turnover Controlling for Illiquidity and Analyst 
Forecast Dispersion (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Low Prior Residual Turnover (Controls for illiquidity and analyst forecast dispersion) 
1 (Most Downgraded) -0.188 -0.709*** 0.889*** 0.420*** 0.379*** -0.381*** 0.8627 94.7 -0.946*** -1.063*** 
 (-0.49) (-4.68) (-2.69) (9.94) (7.06) (-13.00)   (-6.59) (-5.62) 
2 0.297 -0.394*** 0.982 0.349*** 0.449*** -0.253*** 0.9115 191.8 -0.541*** -0.744*** 
 (0.83) (-3.44) (-0.58) (10.93) (11.08) (-11.42)   (-5.45) (-3.95) 
3 0.762** 0.114 0.956 0.268*** 0.462*** -0.277*** 0.9019 283.4 -0.104 -0.329* 
 (2.17) (0.97) (-1.39) (8.20) (11.11) (-12.20)   (-0.99) (-1.73) 
4 1.289*** 0.511*** 1.024 0.351*** 0.487*** -0.194*** 0.9064 296.1 0.407*** 0.237 
 (3.58) (4.33) (0.76) (10.68) (11.67) (-8.49)   (4.55) (1.24) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 1.514*** 0.760*** 1.035 0.316*** 0.389*** -0.169*** 0.8794 190.2 0.605*** 0.464** 
 (4.08) (5.51) (0.93) (8.23) (7.98) (-6.36)   (5.79) (2.21) 
5-1 1.702*** 1.469*** 0.146*** -0.104** 0.010 0.212*** 0.2069 284.8 1.550*** 1.527*** 
  (9.36) (8.48) (3.10) (-2.15) (0.16) (6.31)     (9.49) (9.05) 
Panel C: Low-High Prior Residual Turnover (Controls for illiquidity and analyst forecast dispersion) 
1 (Most Downgraded) -0.393 -0.276 -0.528*** -0.252*** 0.520*** 0.052 0.5889 197.3 -0.475* -0.284 
 (-0.93) (-0.95) (-6.69) (-3.11) (5.06) (0.93)   (-1.74) (-0.94) 
2 -0.099 -0.136 -0.445*** -0.274*** 0.558*** 0.172*** 0.7158 384.2 -0.250 -0.139 
 (-0.26) (-0.62) (-7.48) (-4.49) (7.22) (4.07)   (-1.11) (-0.54) 
3 0.165 0.185 -0.421*** -0.331*** 0.652*** 0.033 0.7739 535.6 0.014 0.217 
 (0.42) (0.93) (-7.77) (-5.94) (9.23) (0.85)   (0.07) (0.93) 
4 0.310 0.332* -0.333*** -0.228*** 0.672*** -0.082** 0.7614 576.7 0.205 0.407* 
 (0.88) (1.79) (-6.63) (-4.42) (10.27) (-2.29)   (1.06) (1.90) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 0.534 0.521*** -0.297*** -0.346*** 0.631*** -0.012 0.7561 384.8 0.390* 0.566** 
 (1.49) (2.75) (-5.76) (-6.55) (9.41) (-0.31)   (1.87) (2.56) 
5-1 0.927*** 0.797*** 0.232*** -0.093 0.111 -0.064 0.0973 582.0 0.865*** 0.850*** 
  (3.77) (3.19) (3.42) (-1.34) (1.25) (-1.32)     (3.84) (3.59) 
***Significant at the 0.01 level 
**Significant at the 0.05 level 







Table V. Change in Turnover after the Recommendation Change Event 
 
The average change in turnover is reported for the sample of recommendation change events. In Panel A, change in % average 
daily turnover is the average daily turnover on the [-1, 1] event window minus the prior [-63, -2] average daily turnover for the 
stock. The averages are in percent (i.e., 1.000 means event turnover minus prior turnover equals 1%). Also in Panel A, is the % 
average daily turnover in the [2 ,42] recommendation drift window minus the prior [-63, -2] average daily turnover for the stock. 
Panels B and C report the change in turnover numbers scaled by analyst coverage and institutional ownership, respectively. The 
analyst coverage scaling variable is the number of analysts covering the stock divided by ten, and the institutional ownership 
variable is the fraction of shares owned by 13f institutions (0.01 is added to the fraction to prevent zero denominators). High 
(low) turnover indicates that the average daily turnover of the stock in [-63, -2] was in the upper (low) half of all stocks 
experiencing recommendation changes in Day 0. Within each turnover group, recommendations are sorted into five portfolios 
containing rating changes in [-4, -2] (most downgraded), -1, 0, +1, and [+2, +4] (most upgraded), respectively. t-statistics in 
parentheses are reported below the averages and are based on standard errors clustered by calendar day with *, **, and ***, 
respectively, indicating statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% levels. 
 
Change in Average % Daily 
Turnover in the [-1, 1] Window   
Change in Average % Daily Turnover in 
the [2, 42] Window Group  High 
Turnover 
Low 





Panel A: Change in Turnover 
1 (Most Downgraded) 1.107*** 0.472*** -0.635***   -0.004 0.059*** 0.063*** 
  (30.19) (17.21) (-13.87)   (-0.52) (19.59) (8.30) 
2 0.815*** 0.294*** -0.521***   -0.020*** 0.047*** 0.066*** 
  (29.19) (24.58) (-17.17)   (-3.99) (26.88) (12.70) 
3 0.184*** 0.085*** -0.100***   -0.038*** 0.035*** 0.073*** 
  (14.19) (17.74) (-7.21)   (-9.43) (17.23) (16.29) 
4 0.302*** 0.133*** -0.169***   -0.011*** 0.043*** 0.054*** 
  (31.79) (35.15) (-16.52)   (-2.97) (38.15) (14.40) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 0.293*** 0.146*** -0.147***   -0.010** 0.053*** 0.062*** 
  (27.63) (31.95) (-12.74)   (-2.42) (34.93) (14.60) 
Panel B: Change in Turnover Scaled by (Number of Analysts÷10) 
1 (Most Downgraded) 2.528*** 1.452*** -1.076***   0.023 0.159*** 0.136*** 
  (18.09) (15.01) (-6.33)   (0.94) (15.40) (5.06) 
2 1.574*** 0.684*** -0.891***   -0.007 0.096*** 0.103*** 
  (18.65) (17.57) (-9.58)   (-0.49) (18.27) (6.46) 
3 0.320*** 0.221*** -0.099***   -0.062*** 0.086*** 0.148*** 
  (10.50) (11.10) (-2.72)   (-5.86) (9.12) (10.44) 
4 0.496*** 0.287*** -0.209***   -0.028*** 0.102*** 0.130*** 
  (17.15) (20.10) (-6.49)   (-2.69) (24.56) (11.55) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 0.581*** 0.385*** -0.195***   -0.041*** 0.151*** 0.193*** 
  (16.08) (18.00) (-4.66)   (-2.90) (22.05) (12.18) 
Panel C: Change in Turnover Scaled by (Fraction of Insitutional Ownership) 
1 (Most Downgraded) 1.858*** 1.025*** -0.833***   -0.055*** 0.126*** 0.181*** 
  (24.99) (18.88) (-9.05)   (-3.32) (15.74) (9.78) 
2 1.352*** 0.658*** -0.693***   -0.093*** 0.103*** 0.196*** 
  (25.15) (23.80) (-11.47)   (-4.99) (16.29) (9.94) 
3 0.297*** 0.256*** -0.041   -0.112*** 0.118*** 0.230*** 
  (11.08) (6.54) (-0.86)   (-8.04) (4.21) (7.36) 
4 0.681*** 0.383*** -0.298***   -0.029* 0.129*** 0.158*** 
  (10.64) (8.62) (-3.82)   (-1.66) (15.25) (8.11) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 0.724*** 0.492*** -0.233***   -0.101*** 0.199*** 0.300*** 
  (10.11) (12.39) (-2.84)   (-3.81) (14.65) (10.07) 
***Significant at the 0.01 level 
**Significant at the 0.05 level 
*Significant at the 0.10 level 
 Table VI. Regression of CAR on Turnover with Multiple Control Variables 
 
Characteristics-adjusted CARs are regressed on the inattention variable (low turnover) with multiple controls. Panel A is for event reaction CARs from Days -1 to +1 of the 
recommendation date and Panel B is for the drift from +2 to +42 trading days from the recommendation date. For each Day 0, firms that experience recommendation changes are 
sorted into two groups based on their average daily turnover [-63,-2] days from the recommendation date. The group with lower turnover has Low Turnover=1. Earnings Surprise 
is the most recently reported actual Q1 earnings minus the I/B/E/S Summary File forecasted earnings before the earnings announcement date, scaled by last month’s price. Forecast 
Revision is the most recent monthly revision in forecasted FY1 earnings, scaled by price. Forecast Dispersion is the most recent standard deviation of FY1 earnings forecasts, 
scaled by the absolute value of the mean forecast. # Analysts is the number of analysts issuing FY1 earnings forecasts. Illiquidity is the average daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure over the same horizon used to compute the average turnover. Small Broker=1 if the broker is not in the top quintile of brokers by number of recommendations issued in 
the prior calendar year. The regressions are estimated for each rating change category, namely, rating changes in [-4, -2] (most downgraded), -1, 0, +1, and [+2, +4] (most 
upgraded). Sample data are from I/B/E/S and CRSP from 1994-2006. The regression is estimated by OLS with the standard errors clustered by calendar day. *, **, and ***, 



















# Obs. (# 
Clusters) 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Characteristic-Adjusted CAR from [-1,1] 
1 (Most Downgraded) -9.799*** 1.645*** -0.334*** 0.496 1.468*** 0.205* 1.983*** 0.178** 2.113*** 2.827 16727 
 (-17.84) (8.20) (-3.11) (0.43) (4.02) (1.90) (10.50) (1.97) (14.60)  (3055) 
2 -8.608*** 1.659*** 0.139 -0.010*** -0.165 0.130** 1.810*** 0.063 1.457*** 1.915 35321 
 (-17.65) (12.59) (1.49) (-4.61) (-0.42) (2.24) (11.72) (0.93) (14.59)  (3188) 
3 -2.743*** 0.412*** 0.376*** -0.299 -0.305 0.069*** 0.228*** 0.091** 0.272*** 0.354 49822 
 (-12.38) (6.16) (8.52) (-0.27) (-0.25) (3.24) (3.13) (2.43) (5.43)  (3201) 
4 1.762*** -0.366*** 0.346*** 0.106 -0.762 0.139*** -1.011*** 0.176*** -0.567*** 0.867 54024 
 (5.36) (-5.21) (4.98) (1.64) (-0.97) (3.19) (-14.88) (2.88) (-11.27)  (3204) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 4.806*** -0.311*** -0.060 0.260 -1.095 -0.001 -1.100*** 0.302*** -0.953*** 1.689 33188 
  (10.11) (-3.93) (-0.70) (0.51) (-0.61) (-0.02) (-14.32) (5.10) (-16.82)  (3190) 
Dependent Variable: Characteristic-adjusted CAR from [2,42] 
1 (Most Downgraded) -2.497*** -0.784*** -0.083 -0.348 -1.228** 0.222 0.186 -0.556** 1.048*** 0.338 16727 
 (-3.30) (-2.83) (-0.53) (-0.18) (-2.46) (1.47) (0.66) (-2.37) (4.91)  (3055) 
2 0.636 -0.726*** -0.235 -0.060*** -0.466 0.223* -0.356 0.284* 0.182 0.122 35321 
 (0.96) (-3.40) (-1.55) (-16.95) (-0.51) (1.74) (-1.61) (1.80) (1.04)  (3188) 
3 1.051* -0.172 -0.139 -8.023*** -2.583 0.103 -0.090 0.022 -0.039 0.084 49822 
 (1.86) (-1.02) (-1.07) (-2.94) (-0.64) (0.92) (-0.47) (0.26) (-0.31)  (3201) 
4 2.693*** 0.182 0.046 0.493*** -4.580*** 0.109 -0.017 0.118 -0.793*** 0.145 54024 
 (3.67) (1.07) (0.31) (3.87) (-3.73) (0.63) (-0.09) (1.11) (-6.38)  (3204) 
5 (Most Upgraded) 2.362** 0.397** 0.147 1.108* -3.017 0.367*** -0.086 0.028 -0.889*** 0.235 33188 
  (2.38) (2.00) (0.82) (1.84) (-1.40) (3.24) (-0.44) (0.22) (-5.99)   (3190) 
***Significant at the 0.01 level 
**Significant at the 0.05 level 





Table VII. Abnormal Returns of Portfolios Sorted by Alternative Attention Proxies 
 
Each day, firms that experience recommendation changes are sorted into two groups based on alternative attention proxies. Panels B-D proxy low attention, respectively, as low 
institutional ownership (the proportion held by 13f institutions), low number of analysts issuing FY1 I/B/E/S estimates in the most recent month, and >100 earnings 
announcements in the market on that day. Panel A’s proxy for low attention is low residual average daily turnover [-63, -2] days from the recommendation date. Residual turnover 
is the residual from a cross-sectional regression of all firms in the CRSP ordinary share universe on the day of the recommendation with average daily turnover regressed against 
15 proxies for illiquidity and uncertainty measured in [-63, -2], namely, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, average trading volume, avg $ trading volume, inverse of avg 
closing price, % days with zero volume, CV of Amihud (2002) measure, CV of volume, CV of $ volume, CV of turnover, holding period return, idiosyncratic volatility, total 
volatility, most recent dispersion of analysts’ FY1 forecasts, most recent SUE, and stdev of past eight SUEs. Within each attention group, firms are then placed into five portfolios 
containing rating changes in [-4, -2] (most downgraded), -1, 0, +1, and [+2, +4] (most upgraded) with firm days where the lagged price is less than one dollar excluded. A rating 
change is the current rating minus the prior rating for the same analyst with anonymous analysts and recommendations made in the three-day window around earnings 
announcements excluded. The daily buy-and-hold-weighted average returns of each portfolio are then compounded to monthly returns, subtracting the risk-free rate and regressed 
on the monthly four factors. Also reported is the average DGTW-adjusted return, which is the portfolio return less the return on a matched size-B/M-momentum characteristic 
portfolio, and the industry-adjusted [Fama-French (1997) 49 industries] return. The abnormal return of the most upgraded minus the most downgraded is reported for the high 
versus low attention group. Sample data are from I/B/E/S and CRSP from 1994-2006. *, **, and ***, respectively, denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% levels with 



























Panel A: Residual Turnover (controlling for multiple 
illiquidity and uncertainty proxies)   
Panel B: Institutional Ownership 
High Attention 0.910*** 0.931*** 0.861*** 0.658***  0.499** 0.465*** 0.441** 0.454** 
 (4.03) (5.47) (4.25) (3.19)  (2.60) (3.16) (2.41) (2.49) 
Low Attention 1.567*** 1.313*** 1.388*** 1.379***  2.095*** 1.938*** 1.865*** 1.746*** 
 (7.19) (7.14) (6.76) (6.64)  (9.21) (11.13) (9.41) (9.05) 
Low-High 0.657** 0.381 0.527** 0.721**  1.595*** 1.474*** 1.424*** 1.292*** 
 (2.49) (1.61) (2.13) (2.56)  (6.81) (7.21) (6.52) (5.49) 
  Panel C: Analyst Coverage 
  
Panel D: Distraction proxy: # of earnings announcement 
news in the aggregate market  
High Attention 0.848*** 0.711*** 0.739*** 0.823***  1.202*** 1.115*** 1.083*** 0.973*** 
 (4.84) (4.53) (4.27) (4.83)  (5.29) (6.28) (5.11) (4.76) 
Low Attention 1.830*** 1.720*** 1.645*** 1.507***  1.953*** 1.695*** 1.769*** 1.954*** 
 (8.16) (10.18) (8.35) (7.83)  (8.14) (7.87) (8.10) (8.01) 
Low-High 0.982*** 1.009*** 0.906*** 0.684***  0.752** 0.580** 0.686** 0.981*** 
  (4.70) (5.01) (4.44) (3.25)   (2.58) (2.22) (2.41) (3.30) 
***Significant at the 0.01 level 
**Significant at the 0.05 level 
*Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 
 Figure I. Distribution of Recommendations Changes 
 
The distribution of the recommendation rating changes described in Table I is displayed. Data are from I/B/E/S Detail 
Recommendation File from 1994-2006. A rating change is the current rating minus the prior rating for the same analyst 
with anonymous analysts and recommendations made in the three-day window around earnings announcements 
excluded. Rating changes based on stale prior ratings (more than one year old) are excluded and the rating change for 
an initiation is computed as the initiation rating minus three (a hold). 
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 Figure II. CAR of Recommendation Changes for High Turnover Versus Low Turnover Stocks 
 
The abnormal return each day is the raw CRSP return less the return on a matched size-B/M-momentum characteristic 
portfolio. Black unbroken lines (red broken lines) indicate the average CAR of recommendations changes for high (low 
turnover stocks). Each day, stocks with recommendation changes are sorted into two groups based on the average daily 
turnover over the period [-63, -2] days from the rating change. A rating change is the current rating minus the prior rating for 
the same analyst with anonymous analysts and recommendations made in the three-day window around earnings 
announcements excluded. Rating changes based on stale prior ratings (more than one year old) are excluded and the rating 
change for an initiation is computed as the initiation rating minus three (a hold). The graph indicates the hedged CAR 
(upgrade-downgrade) where upgrades are rating changes ≥+2 and downgrades are rating changes ≤-2. Firm days where the 
lagged price is less than one dollar are excluded. Recommendations are from I/B/E/S from 1994-2006. 
 
 Low turnover - - - - -       High turnover ——— 
Upgrade minus downgrade 
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Figure III. Percentage of Average CAR Occurring on Recommendation Date 
 
This table reports whether low prior turnover firms underreact more to recommendation changes. The top graph illustrates the 
percentage of average one month [-1, 21] CAR that occurs on the [-1, 1] recommendation change date. The next two graphs 
are for the two month [-1, 42] and three month [-1, 63] horizons, respectively. A percentage ≥0, but <100 represents 
underreaction and overreaction otherwise. For each day, firms with rating changes are classified into high turnover and low 
turnover groups according to the average daily percentage of shares traded from [-63, -2] days of the recommendation date. 
NASDAQ firms have their CRSP volume divided by two to account for inter-dealer double counting. Firms are then placed 
in five rating change groups: [-4, -2] (most downgraded), -1, 0, +1, and [+2, +4] (most upgraded). The abnormal return each 
day is the raw CRSP return less the return on a matched size-B/M-momentum characteristic portfolio. Days where the lagged 
stock price is less than one dollar are excluded. Average CAR numbers are from Table II and recommendations are from 
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